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THE ENDURANCE OF PROSECUTORIAL
IMMUNITY-HOW THE FEDERAL
COURTS VITIATED BUCKLEY V.
FITZSIMMONS
Between the private life of the citizen and the public glare
of criminal accusation stands the prosecutor.'
1. INTRODUCTION
When the United States Supreme Court handed down its opinion
in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons in June 1993,2 the decision was heralded as
the beginning of the end of absolute prosecutorial immunity.' Prior to
Buckley, a state or federal prosecutor accused of inflicting a constitu-
tional harm through prosecutorial misconduct and sued in his or her
individual capacity could claim absolute immunity from civil suit. 4 If
the alleged acts were found to be intimately related to the judicial
phase of the criminal process and to the prosecutor's role as an advo-
cate, the plaintiff's case would fail. 5 With Buckley, the commentators
announced, the Supreme Court had dealt an unprecedented blow to
this tradition of immunity, sending an unmistakable message to over-
zealous p•osecutors. 6 No longer would acts that are only tangentially
related to prosecution be afforded full protection from liability.' No
longer would the federal courts hearing these civil rights actions be
able simply to shield pre-indictment acts with the same immunity
accorded to the ensuing prosecution' The Supreme Court had drawn
I Young v. United States ex ret, Vuitton et. Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987).
2 Buckley v. FitZSitI/111011S, 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
3 See, e.g., Thomas J. Foltz, A Shaky Bridge Over Troubled Water: Prosecutorial Immunity No
Longer Absolute, 8 GRIM, JusT., Winter 1994, at 21, 61; Brian P. Barrow, Note and COMMellt,
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons: Tradition Pays a Price for the Reduction of Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16
WHirrwit L. Rity. 301, 303, 325 (1995);Jautes P. Kenner, Note, Prosecutorial Immunity: Removal
of the Shield Destroys the Effectiveness  of the Sword, 33 WAsi tumor LJ. 402, 425-27 (1994); Deborah
S. Platz, Note and Comment, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons: The. Beginning of the End for Absolute
Prosecutorial Immunity, 18 Novi% L. Rcv. 1919, 1939 (1994); Richard C. Reuben, Court Narrows
Suit Immunity for Prosecutors: Limit for Probes, Remarks, L.A. DAIIN J., June 25, 1993, at 1.
1 See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 416- 17, 431 (1976).
See, e.g., id.
6 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3.
7 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3.
8 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3.
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a line, it was reported, that on its face purported only to withdraw
absolute immunity for prosecutorial acts prior to the existence of
probable cause to arrest, but that might have far broader implications.'
Whatever threat Buckley may have posed to the highly deferential
doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, however, has not yet materialized.
This Note argues that the federal circuit courts have not read Buckley's
arguably ambiguous holding to significantly alter their application of
immunity doctrine.'° Rather, it appears that the doctrine of absolute
prosecutorial immunity has emerged largely unchanged." This Note
first examines the holding in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons and the issues left
unresolved by that decision. 12
 It then argues that rather than resolving
those ambiguities in favor of increased prosecutorial liability, the prose-
cutorial immunity cases decided by the federal circuit courts since
Buckley have, explicitly or implicitly, interpreted Buckley's holding so as
to maintain pre-existing prosecutorial immunity doctrine.is
Part 11 gives a brief overview of § 1983 and Bivens claims, the
typical forms in which victims of constitutional harms bring claims
against prosecutors." Part III describes and contrasts absolute and
qualified immunity,'' Part IV details the historical development of
prosecutorial immunity, from the common law to the present.' 6 Part V
analyzes the holding in Buckley and its impact on pre-existing immunity
doctrine.'' Finally, Part VI reviews the federal circuit court prosecuto-
rial immunity decisions since Buckley and argues that those courts have
either disregarded the potential impact of Buckley or have resolved its
ambiguities in favor of an unchanged absolute immunity doctrine.'
II. SECTION 1983 AND BIVENS CLAIMS AGAINST FEDERAL.
PROSECUTORS
An individual who claims that a state or federal prosecutor de-
prived that individual of his or her constitutional rights and who wishes
to sue that prosecutor in his or her individual capacity typically files
either a § 1983 claim, in the case of a state prosecutor, or a Bivens
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3.
vl See discussion infix part V.
11 See discussion Infra part V.
12
 See infra notes 146-222 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 223-338 and accompanying text
14 See infra notes 10-38 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 30-55 and accompanying text.
16
 See infra notes 56-184 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 185-222 and accompanying text.
u' See infra notes 223-338 and accompanying text.
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claim, when the prosecutor derives his authority from federal law." A
cause of action exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, originally passed as
section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, against any person who, under
color of state law, subjects any other person to a deprivation of his or
her statutory or constitutional rights.'" The ability to redress a depriva-
tion of a constitutional right by a federal actor, however, is not derived
from a statute, but rather was established by the United States Supreme
Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics. 21 The law applicable to a Bivens claim against a federal official
mirrors that applicable to a § 1983 claim against a state official!'
In 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, the Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for dam-
ages against officials who violate a person's constitutional or statutory
rights while acting under color of federal law.'" In Bivens, Webster
Bivens filed suit in federal district court claiming that agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, acting under color of federal authority
and in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, conducted a war-
rantless search of his apartment and employed unreasonable force in
his arrest for alleged narcotics violations.''' The district court dismissed
his complaint for failure to state a cause of action, and the United
19 See 42 U.S.C.	 1983 (1994); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). The plaintiff may also file additional claims against the
prosecutor under other statutory provisions, or slate tort law or a slate Constitution, arid may file
any number of claims against other aeon's, such as the federal government under the Federal
Tort. Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1994). See, e.g., Moore v. Vaider, 65 F.3d 189, 191 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (claims under Bivens. and Federal Tort Claims Act.); Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 E3d 1241,
1244 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994) (claims tinder U.S. Constitution, §§ 1983 and 1986 and New jersey law);
Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1144-45 (8th Cir. 1993) (claims under § 1983, Nebraska Constitution,
Nebraska Civil Rights Act and Nebraska tort law),
2° 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 reads in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any slalthe, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be ,subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall he liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding Ow redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
22 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
25 403 U.S. at 397. The Bivens Court only specifically recognized claims under the Fourth
Amendment. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS,
DEFENSES, AND FEES § 1.4, at 15 (2d ed. 1991). Following the Biven.s decision, the United States
Supreme Court recognized Bivens-type claims under certain other constitutional provisions. See
id. at 15 n.86 for a sampling of those cases and their constitutional subjects.
24 403 U.S. at 389.
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 25
 The agent-
defendants had successfully argued that the only remedies for Fourth
Amendment violations existed under state tort law, with the Fourth
Amendment serving only to limit Federal defenses to the state law suit. 26
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the
Fourth Amendment provides an independent limitation on the exer-
cise of federal power, a cause of action for constitutional deprivations
by federal officers exists directly under the Fourth Amendment."
The Bivens Court noted that Supreme Court caselaw long rejected
the idea that the Fourth Amendment only prohibits conduct by federal
officials that would be actionable if committed by private individuals
under state tort law. 28
 The Court reasoned that this broader sweep of
the Fourth Amendment is necessary where a federal official's potential
for inflicting harm on a citizen far exceeds that of a private individual. 29
For example, where the mere invocation of federal authority can ren-
der the private citizen virtually powerless to refuse or resist, it is clear
that the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment search and
seizure limitation differ significantly from those underlying state law
trespass and privacy claims against private actors." The Court noted
that this special concern for the misuse of federal power is further
evidenced by the fact that states are not authorized to broaden or limit
federal authority."' The Bivens Court thus recognized a cause of action
against federal officials who deprive an individual of his or her Fourth
Amendment rights. 32
The plaintiff in a § 1983 or Bivens claim may file a civil suit directly
against the state or Federal official and seek compensatory and punitive
damages against that official in his or her personal capacity." In addi-
tion to proving the elements of a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff charging
prosecutorial misconduct relating to a wrongful conviction must first
25 Id. at 390.
21'1d. at 390-91. In other words, if Bivens could prove the agents violated the Fourth
Amendment., then the agents could not argue that their actions were a legitimate exercise of
federal power. See id. at 391.
27 1d. at 392, 397. The &yens Court also reaffirmed the notion that money damages are an
appropriate remedy for injuries resulting from a constitutional violation that amounts to an
"invasion of personal interests in liberty." Id. at 395, 397.
23 Id. at 392.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392.
141 Id. at 394-95.
31 Id. at 395.
32 1d. at 397. Bivens was a six•o-three decision. justice Harlan wrote a concurring Opinion,
and Chief justice Burgerjustice Black anditistice Blackmun each wrote dissenting opinions. See
id. at 388.
53
 See, e.g., Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 191 (D.C. Cir, 1995).
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establish that the prior criminal proceeding ended in the former
defendant's favor. 34 For the plaintiff to recover damages for any § 1983
action that would, if successful, render the plaintiff's prior conviction
or sentence invalid, the plaintiff must prove that the predicate convic-
tion or sentence has already been reversed on direct appeal, expunged
by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or been the
subject of a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." In
other words, until the challenged conviction or sentence has been
officially invalidated, it cannot form the basis for a § 1983 claim." The
rules of immunity and other defenses available under § 1983 are,
however, similarly available in a Bivens claim. 37 In both § 1983 and
Bivens claims, the burden is on the defendant official to show that such
immunity or defense appropriately applies to the alleged act."
III. ABSOLUTE VS. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Immunities available to defendant officials in § 1983 and Bivens
claims can be classified into two types, absolute and qualified. 3" Abso-
lute immunity provides an affirmative defense to officials whose special
functions or constitutional status require complete protection from
civil suit.° The Supreme Court only acknowledges absolute immunity
where specially justified by public policy considerations. 41 Otherwise,
there is a presumption that the affirmative defense of qualified immu-
nity provides sufficient protection for official acts. 42
There are crucial substantive and procedural differences between
absolute immunity and qualified immunity to suit. The defense of
absolute immunity can defeat a civil suit anytime after it has been filed,
as long as the official's alleged acts are within the scope of the appli-
cable immunity.43 By contrast, though a defendant claiming qualified
34 Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, '1372 (1994). The elements of a § 1983 claim may be
stated as (1) a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right; (2) proximately caused; (3)
by a "person"; (4) who acted "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia ...." ScuwAtcrz & KIRKLIN, supra note 23,
§ 1.4.
35 Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2372. The Heck decision also noted that the § 1983 plaintiff need not
have exhausted his or her state remedies prior to filing the § 1983 claim. Id. at 2370.
36 Id. at 2372.
"Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 17 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied 437 U.S. 904 (1978),
"Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 978, 486 (1991).
"Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
40 1d. at 807.
41 See Burns, 500 U.S. at 487; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 808.
42 Burns, 500 U.S. at 486-87.
95 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976). The defendant official may assert the
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immunity may move for summary judgment, that defense does not
immediately defeat the suit, but only introduces a standard against
which the defendant-official's actions will be measured. 44
In 1982, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the United States Supreme Court
reformed qualified immunity doctrine by establishing an objective
standard under which an official is only liable if he or she violates
"clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reason-
able person would have known."15
 The Supreme Court replaced the
old "good faith" qualified immunity standard, which included both
subjective and objective components that were difficult and costly for
courts to resolve, with this purely objective standard so as to facilitlite
the early dismissal of frivolous § 1983 or Bivens claims.46
 In the context
of § 1983 or Bivens claims, the presumption is that qualified immunity
provides a sufficient level of protection for the official function.' The
Supreme Court views the qualified immunity doctrine as reflecting
a reasonable balance between the need to protect individual rights
and the public interest in promoting the "vigorous exercise of official
authority. "48
The Court has stated, furthermore, that the purely objective quali-
fied immunity standard should not encourage or permit harassment
litigation because federal courts can weed out insubstantial claims on
immunity defense in a motion for dismissal under FEn. R. Cw,
	 12(b) (6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19; hnbler, 424 U.S. at 419 n.13.
45 See 457 U.S. at 818. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in "Tarim to determine the
immunity available to senior presidential aides and advisors. Id. at 806. The plaintiff in Harlow
had brought suit against former President Richard M. Nixon and two of his senior White I-louse
aides, claiming they conspired to violate his statutory and constitutional rights by u n lawfully
dismissing him from employment with the Department of the Air Force in retaliation for certain
testimony before a congressional subcommittee. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 734, 740
(1982). The federal district court denied the defendants' motions fin' summary judgment, finding
a sufficient Diverts claim under the First Amendment and finding that the aides lacked absolute
immunity. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 805-06. The aides appealed the denial of immunity separately front
the President. Id. For details of the alleged conspiracy and the President's appeal, see Nixon, 457
U.S. at 731.
4 ' Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16, 818. The objective component involved a presumptive knowl-
edge of the constitutional right at issue, while the subjective component focused on the official's
intentions, Id. at 815. Qualified immunity would be defeated if the official "knew or reasonably
should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate
the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the malicious intention
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury." Id. Yet many courts treated the
official's subjective intent as a question of fact for the jury (under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure), often undermining the Court's pronnse that insubstantial claims would be
defeated on summary . judgment. See id. at 816.
Sums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991); see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.
rs Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807; Butz v. Econotnou, 438 U.S. 478. 506-07 (1978); see also Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 245-48 (1974).
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motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment.° In laying out
the summary judgment standard, the Court opined that the trial judge
must determine not only the currently applicable law, but also whether
that law was clearly established at the time of the alleged constitutional
deprivation.'" If the constitutional or statutory protection was not clearly
established at the time of the alleged deprivation, the official will not
be liable for failing to anticipate the legal development. 51 If the law was
clearly established at the time of the violation, the qualified immunity
defense ordinarily will fail, because a public official is expected to know
the law governing his or her office." The Supreme Court stated that
in a case involving a defense of qualified immunity the determination
of the then-existing legal standard presents a threshold question that
should be resolved before discovery begins.'; This threshold inquiry
thus includes the determination that the plaintiff has asserted an actual
violation of a constitutional right in the first place. 54
An absolute immunity defense does not require this initial deter-
mination. Therefore, the procedural advantage of absolute immunity,
the avoidance of civil suit significantly earlier in the legal process,
makes it a much more attractive and coveted defense than qualified
immunity, which requires, at the very least, an initial response to the
claim on its merits. Qualified immunity, like absolute immunity, is an
immunity from suit. rather than a mere defense, and if either immunity
defense is not raised or fails, even erroneously, to forestall trial, then
the defense is effectively lost."'
IV. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
A. Common Law Prosecutorial Immunity
Under the common law, prosecutors were immune from civil suits
for malicious prosecution and defamation.'' Additionally, they could
411 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 808.
GI. at 818.
Cl Id.
52 Id. ai 818-19. The Gam recognized the passibility that an official could successfully plead
that extraordinary circumstances prevented actual knowledge, or reason to know, of the relevant
legal standard. Id. at 819.
53 See id. at 818. A court order denying qualified or absolute immunity, such as the denial of
a motion for summary judgment, is not subject to the 28 U.S.C. § 1291 finality requirement and
is therefore immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
54 Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991).
." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.
5 ' 1 See Burns v. Reed, 500 U,S, 478, 485 (1991).
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not be held liable for the knowing use of false or misleading testimony
during trial or before a grand jury. 57
 In 1896, in Griffith v. Slinkard, the
Supreme Court of Indiana became the first American court to address
the issue of a prosecutor's amenability to civil suit. 58 The plaintiff
claimed that without probable cause and after a grand jury had refused
to indict, a local prosecutor added the plaintiff's name to the indict-
ment of his alleged co-conspirator, resulting in the plaintiff's arrest."
The court dismissed the claim on the ground that the prosecutor was
absolutely immune to suit. 6°
The United States Supreme Court considered the issue of prose-
cutorial immunity for the first time in 1927 in Yaselli v. Goff, in which
the Court held a prosecutor absolutely immune from civil actions for
malicious prosecution where the alleged acts pertained to indictment
and prosecution of a criminal case. 6 ' In Yaselli, the plaintiff claimed
that a Special Assistant to the United States Attorney General inten-
tionally presented false and misleading evidence to a grand jury to
secure his indictment. 6' The criminal case against the plaintiff had
ended with a directed verdict against the Government, and the plaintiff
sought $300,000 in civil damages for malicious prosecution in the
following civil suit.° The district court dismissed the complaint, and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld that
decision.64
 The Second Circuit's opinion, affirmed by the Supreme
Court, noted that. prosecutorial immunity from civil actions for mali-
cious prosecution based on alleged transgressions in the indictment or
prosecution phases is "absolute, and is grounded on principles of
public policy."65
The policy justifications underlying these early grants of absolute
immunity varied. Some courts have described prosecutorial immunity
as quasi-judicia1. 6" Judicial immunity for acts within the judge's jurisdic-
tion can be traced to the early English common law, as can the immu-
nity of grand jurors.° These courts reason that judges, grand jurors
57 See id.
58
 See linbler v. Pachtinan, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976) (discussing Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E.
1001 (Ind. 1896)).
Griffith, 44 N.E. at 1001.
6° Id. at 1002.
61
 275 U.S. 503 (1927), affg 12 F.2d 396, 406 (2d Cir. 1926).
1i2
 Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 397 (2d Cir. 1926), affd 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
63
 Id. at 398.
Id. at 399, 407.
65 Id. at 406.
66 See, e.g., id. at 402, 404; Watts v. Gerking, '228 P. 135, 137 (Cal. 1924).
67 See Floyd v. Barker, 12 Coke 23, 24, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1306 (1608). The United States
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and prosecutors all perform the discretionary function of evaluating
evidence presented to them. 68 The United States Supreme Court has
not adopted the "quasi-judicial" characterization, but has acknowledged
that the same major policy considerations underlie both judicial and
prosecutorial immunity: concern that tneritless litigation could be used
to harass the official, distracting that official from his or her primary
public purpose; and the potential that the threat of such litigation
would influence the independent judgment crucial to the official's
public role.''''
B. The Preservation of Common Law Immunities Under § 1983
There are no immunities explicitly recognized in the language of
42 U.S.C. § 1983, originally passed as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871. 7" The United States Supreme Court first considered the intent
of the Reconstruction Congress with regard to immunities under the
forerunner to § 1983 in its 1951 Pitney v. Brandhove decision. 7 t The
Court concluded that the passage of § 1983 was not intended to abro-
gate immunities that previously had been available to various catego-
ries of officials on public policy grounds. 72 In Tenney, therefore, be-
cause legislators in both the United States and England had enjoyed
absolute immunity prior to the enacunent of § 1983, members of a state
legislative committee were accorded absolute immunity in a § 1983 suit
charging that they had called the plaintiff before the committee, in
violation of his constitutional rights, to coerce his silence on matters
of public concern." The Penney decision established the principle that
Supreme Court first recognized absolute judicial immunity in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
335, 351, 354 (1872). See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976). For the argument
that Congress could not have intended the common law judicial immunity to be preserved under
§ 1983 because that immunity would not he recognized as the common law until the 1872
decision in Bradley, see John C. Filosa, Comment, Prosecutorial Immunity: No Place for Absolutes,
1983 U. ILL. L. Rev. 977, 981 (1983).
68 !ruble', 424 U.S. at 423 n.20.
69 See id. at 422-23.
70 Id. at 417.
71 See 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). In Tenney, the Supreme Court considered the immunity of
members of the California legislature's "un-American activities" committee to civil suit under the
prior § 43 of Title 8, the predecessor to the current! § 1983, and held that the Reconstruction
Congress did not intend to displace the legislative immunity enshrined in Article 1, § 6 of the
U.S. Constitution. Id. at 369, 376. The ',limn/ Court noted that Congress passed the Reconstruc-
tion Act of 1871 without debating or otherwise expressing its intended limits. Id. at 376. The
Court refused to find an implied or implicit Congressional intent that would override the
common law tradition of immunities. Id.
72 Id. at 376; see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418.
73 Thins 341 U.S. at 379; see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418. The Court noted that the official's
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§ 1983 will be read as consistent with previously existing tort defenses
and immunities. 7^
Since Tenney, the United States Supreme Court has preserved a
number of common law immunities under § 1983, 75
 The United States
Supreme Court reaffirmed in 1967 that judges have absolute immunity
from § 1983 suits for acts committed within their jurisdiction and
judicial function. 76
 In that same year, the Supreme Court held that
police officers subject to § 1983 suits enjoy a "good faith and probable
cause" defense comparable to the common law defense to false arrest. 77
In 1974, the Court held that governors and other state executive
officials have a qualified immunity that varies with "the scope of dis-
cretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as
they reasonably appeared at the time of the action."78 In 1975, the
Supreme Court determined that school officials acting in a disciplinar-
ian role have a qualified immunity freeing them from liability under
§ 1983 so long as they acted without malicious intent to cause a con-
stitutional injury and could not reasonably have known their actions
violated students' constitutional rights. 79 Qualified immunity is now
determined under the Harlow objective standard,89 but in each of these
contexts, the Court examined the nature of the immunity under the
common law and recognized essentially the same immunity under
§ 1983. 81
The United States Supreme Court has also stated, however, that it
will use restraint in extending immunities beyond those found in the
common law, even when confronted by compelling policy arguments. 82
The Court has grounded its decisions in the common law and in
history because its role is "not to make a freewheeling policy choice,"
but to attempt to discern the intent of the Reconstruction Congress
that enacted the predecessor to § 1983. 83
improper purpose would not defeat the immunity, because the immunity is not a reward for the
individual's noble action, but only serves the public good. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377.
hnbirel; 424 U.S. al 418.
75 /d.
7 ' See, e.g,, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967), For the common-law absolute
immunity of judges, see Bradley v, Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
77 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557,
SCheller v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). The plaintiffs in Scheuer represented the
estates of three students killed by members of the National Guard during a student protest at
Kent State University in May 1970. Id. at 239.
78 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
84 See Harlow v, Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
81 filthier v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 909, 419 (1976).
82 See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,
4811417 (1091).
" Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986). The Court has stated: We do not have a license
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C. The Supreme Court's Prosecutorial Immunity Doctrine:
Imbler and Burns
The United States Supreme Court has specifically addressed the
issue of prosecutorial immunity to § 1983 suits only three times. 84 In
1976, in Imbler v. Pachtman, the United States Supreme Court held that
a state prosecutor has absolute immunity from civil suit under § 1983
for any act within the scope of his or her duties in initiating a criminal
prosecution and presenting the criminal case. 85 In Imbler, Paul lmbler
filed a § 1983 suit claiming that the district attorney had presented
false testimony and suppressed evidence concerning the testimony of
a fingerprint expert during Imbler's murder trial." The Court drew
upon the absolute immunity from malicious prosecution suits at com-
mon law and reasoned that such a rule would prevent harassment suits
from burdening both the prosecutor and the criminal justice system."
Thus, the Court held the district attorney absolutely immune from suit
for his actions in initiating and presenting the murder case."
Imbler was convicted of first-degree felony murder for the 1961
shooting of a Los Angeles market manager." The jury fixed his sen-
tence at death.'" The Supreme Court of California upheld his convic-
tion in a 1962 decision, but shortly thereafter, Deputy District Attorney
Richard Pachtman, the prosecutor at Imbler's trial, informed the Gov-
ernor of California that following trial he and a state correctional
authority investigator had discovered new evidence relating to the
case. 9 ' They had discovered witnesses who could corroborate Imbler's
alibi, his primary defense at trial, and some additional information
discrediting the trustworthiness of the prosecution's main identifica-
tion witness, Alfred Costello, who had been passing by on the night of
the shooting and claimed to have two clear views of Imbler. 92 Imbler
filed a state habeas corpus petition, and the Supreme Court of Califor-
to establish immunities from § 1983 actions in the interests of what we judge to be sound public
policy." Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914,922-23 (1984).
" See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269; Bursts, 500 U.S. at 478; linbler, 424 U.S. at 409. The Supreme
Court also considered the issue of prosecutorial immunity in a non-§ 1983 context in Yaselli v.
Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927), an 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926). For a discussion of Yaselli, see supra
notes 61-65 and accompanying text..
145 Imbler; 424 U.S. at 431.
86 Id. at 416.
° See id. at 420,425-26.
88 Id. at 431.
" Id. at 411-12.
99 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 412.
• 1 Id. The letter was dated August 17,1902, and Imbler's execution, scheduled for September
12,1962, was later stayed. Id. at 413 n.5.
92 1d. at 411,413.
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nia appointed one of its retired justices to act as referee.° During the
referee's hearing Costello retracted his trial identification of Imbler
and revealed that he had embellished testimony relating to his own
background." Imbler's counsel praised Pachtman's post-trial investiga-
tion, but claimed that the prosecution had knowingly used false testi-
mony and suppressed material evidence at tria1.95 In 1963, the Supreme
Court of California denied the writ, citing the referee's findings that
Costello's retraction at the habeas hearing was less credible than his
original trial identification and that Imbler's corroborating witnesses
had been impeached.96 In late 1967 or early 1968, Imbler filed a federal
habeas corpus petition based on the same arguments rejected in his
state habeas hearing.'7 The federal district court found eight instances
of state misconduct in the record of Imbler's original trial." Six con-
sisted of the prosecution's use of misleading or false testimony by
Costello, and the other two were suppressions of evidence favorable to
Imbler by a fingerprint expert.° The court ordered that the writ would
issue if Imbler was not retried within sixty days." When the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, the
State of California chose not to retry Imbler and he was subsequently
released."
In 1972, Imbler filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Pachtman, the police fingerprint expert and various other Los
Angeles law enforcement officers claiming a conspiracy to unlawfully
charge and convict him and seeking $2.7 million from each defendant
plus attorney's fees." With regard to Pachtman, Imbler claimed that
the prosecutor had "with intent, and on other occasions with negli-
gence" allowed Costello to give false testimony and that the suppres-
sion of evidence by the fingerprint expert was chargeable to Pachtman
under federal law." Imbler also claimed that Pachtman initiated the
93 Id. at 413.
94 Id.
iMbier, 424 U.S. at 413.
96 Id. at 413-14. The following year, Imbler's death sentence was overturned on other
grounds and the State stipulated to life imprisonment. Id. at 414.
97 Id. at 414.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 414-15. The district coon found Costello had given misleading and ambiguous
testimony and had lied about his criminal record, education and current income. Id. at 414 n.B.
The court found that either Pachtman or a police ollicer in the courtroom knew that the
misleading testimony was misleading, and that Pachtman had reason to suspect that the false
testimony was indeed false. Id.
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 415.
101 Id.
192 Id. at 415- 16.
103 Id. at 416.
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prosecution knowing that Imbler had passed a lie detector test and
that Pachtman had altered a police artist's sketch of the killer to
resemble Imbler once the investigation had focused on him." The
district court found that Pachtman was immune from civil liability for
these alleged acts and dismissed the complaint as to him." That court
described the alleged acts as prosecutorial activities integral to the
judicial process.m
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
for the first time whether a state prosecuting attorney, acting within
the scope of his or her duties in initiating and conducting a criminal
prosecution, could be sued under § 1983. 107 The Imbler Court acknow-
ledged the numerous decisions by federal courts of appeals recogniz-
ing absolute prosecutorial immunity from § 1983 suits and reaffirmed
that the proper inquiry focuses on the immunity granted to the prose-
cutor at common law and the policies historically underlying that grant
of immunity."' The Court held that the same policy considerations
underlying the common law rule of prosecutorial immunity from ma-
licious prosecution suits supported preserving that immunity as a de-
fense to § 1983 claims.m
The Imbler Court noted that if a prosecutor had only a qualified
immunity, the burden of meeting that standard would not only under-
mine the performance of his or her public duties, but would actually
impose a greater burden than the same standard applied to other
executive or administrative officials.' I° The Court stated that the types
of prosecutorial activities that are most susceptible to civil suit are
"typical of issues with which judges struggle in actions for post-trial
relief, sometimes to differing conclusions."'" The Court stated that a
post-trial examination of the prosecutor's knowledge of witnesses' un-
truthfulness or misrepresentation of facts, the prosecutor's failure to
disclose material evidence, or the propriety of opening and closing
statements would involve "a virtual retrial" of the crime and the sub-
mission of legally technical issues to a lay jury." 2
 The Court reasoned
that because the prosecutor's workload requires myriad decisions that
could give rise to tenable constitutional claims, not only would an
104 ht.
105 Imbler 424 U.S. at 416.
1 °6 1d. at 416-17.
1 °7 1d. at 410.
I" See id. at 420-21. For a sampling of circuit decisions acknowledging absolute § 1983
immunity fbr prosecutors, see id. at 420 m16.
at 424; see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
1111 /mbier, 424 U.S. at 425.
111 1d.
"21d.
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accused prosecutor be distracted from his primary duty of law enforce-
ment, but defending such claims, often years after alleged acts took
place, would also impose "intolerable burdens" upon both the prose-
cutor and the criminal justice system.I 18
The Supreme Court noted that the proper functioning of the
criminal justice system requires that the prosecutor have broad discre-
tion in presenting the government's case." 4 Knowledge of possible
personal liability in post-trial civil suits might prompt the prosecutor
to resolve doubts about witnesses or evidence in such a way that would
deny the trier of fact potentially relevant evidence, or avoid trial en-
tirely."' Where the prosecutor believes that acquittal is a significant
possibility, he or she might abandon the case, when the proper course
of action would he to let a jury make the determination. 1 k 8
The Court suggested, furthermore, that the decisions of judges
reviewing petitions for pre-conviction or post-conviction relief at the origi-
nal trial—in appellate review or in state or federal habeas corpus
reviews—might be colored by the knowledge that a finding of prose-
cutorial misconduct could result in the prosecutor's civil liability. 17 The
Court also suggested that not only might the judge be consciously or
subconsciously influenced during a post-trial review of alleged prose-
cutorial misconduct, but also the prosecutor might question his or her
continuing ethical duty to inform the court of any material evidence
suggestive of innocence or mitigation that might be uncovered follow-
ing the trial.''" The Court reasoned that although the decision to
exercise this post-trial disclosure duty is already influenced by the
knowledge that after-acquired evidence could overturn a prior convic-
tion, a qualified immunity would certainly lessen the prosecutor's in-
centive to comply with the ethical imperative."'
The Supreme Court thus held that in initiating a prosecution and
presenting the case, undeniably advocatory functions, the prosecutor
enjoys absolute immunity from civil suit under § 1983. 120 The Court
113 hi. at 425-26,
1 " Id. at 426. The fodder Court acknowledged that its decision balanced the rights of a
genuinely wronged defendant against the public interest in criminal justice in favor of the latter,
but suggested the continuing viability of criminal charges and professional sauction,s to deter, if
not reinedy, willful constitutional violations. Id. al 427-28, 428-29.
115 hilb/PI, 424 U.S. at 426.
116 1d. at 426 n.24.
J17 Id. at 427.
118 Id. at 427 n.25; see also, e.g., Ntoovi, Copt: OF l'RoFEssioNAL RESI'ONSIBILITY DR 7-103
(1983); MoDEL Rut.Es OF PROFESSIONAL CONIMCF Rule 3.8 (1990).
119 See lodger, 424 U.S. at 427 n.25.
120
 Id. at 430-31. justice White, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the knowing use of false
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explicitly recognized certain prosecutorial functions as advocatory: the
decisions whether to present a case to the grand jury and whether to
file an information, whether and when to initiate a prosecution, whether
to dismiss an indictment, which witnesses to present, and the "obtain-
ing, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence. ”121 The Court rested its
holding on public policy grounds, noting that any lesser protection
would place intolerable burdens on the prosecutorial law enforcement
function and the entire criminal justice system.' 22 The hnbler Court
indicated the boundaries of its decision by expressly reserving the issue
of what type of immunity would be accorded non-advocatory prosecu-
torial acts, such as activities that the prosecutor conducted in the role
of investigator or administrator.' 2"
In 1991, in Burns m Reed, the United States Supreme Court revis-
ited the issue of prosecutorial immunity to answer the question re-
served in hnbler what level of immunity should be accorded a prose-
cutor for non-advocatory acts.' 24
 The Court held that only qualified
immunity is available to prosecutors engaging in non-advocatory func-
tions. 125 Burns involved a § 1983 suit that alleged that a state prosecutor
had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights by advising police on
the use of hypnosis and on the sufficiency of their probable cause to
arrest, and by withholding certain evidence at a subsequent search
warrant probable cause hearing. 12" The Court reasoned that the poli-
cies underlying absolute immunity, freeing the prosecutor from threats
of unfounded litigation and the system from the burden of disposing
of such suits, only extend to acts of an advocatory nature, not to
or perjured testhnony should receive absolute innnunity, but (Mind nu ecnnmon law basis or policy
justification for extending absolute immunity beyond the prosecutor's initiation and presentation
of the case. Id. at 433-34, 440-42 (White, J., concurring), Thus lie would not grant absolute
iumninhy 6w an alleged failure to disclose material or exculpatory evidence. M. at 441 (White,
J., concurring). White, recognizing the need to affirmatively encourage disclosure where the
judicial process often will not discover or remedy the withholding of material evidence, reasoned
that immunity doctrine should, arid does, only reward the presentation of testinuniy or other
evidence, and not its suppression. See id. at 442-43 (White, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 431 n.33.
122 See id. at 425-26. In 1977, Congress considered adding a subsection (e) to I:3 1983 that
would have made a prosecutor personally liable for actions or omissions in the mune of the
prosecution, if the prosecutor violated (or would have violated had there been a conviction) a
criminal defendant's Fifth or Fourieenth Amendment due process rights or otherwise suppressed
or destroyed evidence. See S  3 r 4ntli
 Cong., 1st Sess. (amend. 1426, Oct. 6, 1977). The proposed
amendment was highly criticized in committee hearings, especially by representatives of slate
prosecutors' offices, and never passed. See Filusa, supra note 67, at 990.
125 1mbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31.
124 See Burns, 500 U.S. 478, 48 L (1991).
125 1d. at 496.
126
 Id. at 482-83.
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investigative or administrative functions.' 27
 Thus, the Court held the
prosecutor absolutely immune from suit for his advocatory participa-
tion in the probable cause hearing, but granted only qualified immu-
nity for his investigatory acts of advising the police. 128
In Burns, Cathy Burns filed a § 1983 claim in federal court, against
police officers and the state prosecutor, claiming they had violated her
Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during pre-trial inves-
tigation and hearings relating to a 1982 shooting incident.' 29 Burns,
who was a suspect in the 1982 shooting of her two sons, claimed that
the prosecutor advised the investigating officers of the permissibility
of hypnosis as an investigative technique.m When Burns made seem-
ingly incriminating statements under hypnosis, the prosecutor advised
the officers that they most likely had probable cause to arrest her."' At
a search warrant probable cause hearing following her arrest, the
prosecutor failed to inform the judge that the confession was made
under hypnosis or that Burns had otherwise consistently denied com-
mitting the crime, omissions that Burns characterized as suborning
false testimony designed to deliberately mislead the court."' At the
close of Burns's case, the district court hearing the § 1983 claim granted
the prosecutor's motion for a directed verdict pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 50, finding him absolutely immune from liability for
his prosecutorial conduct, and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the same grounds.'"The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over the
proper method of distinguishing protected advocatory acts and unpro-
tected administrative or investigatory acts."'
The Supreme Court held that a prosecutor enjoys absolute immu-
nity from liability for participation in a pre-trial probable cause hear-
127 Id. at 490-91, 494.
128 Id. at 487, 496.
129 500 U.S. at 481, 483.
' sold. at 481-82.
131 Id. at 482. The police suspected Burns might have multiple personalities, one of which
committed the crime. Id. Following four months of observation at a state hospital it was deter-
mined that she did not in fact have multiple personalities, and she was released. Id. at 482 n.l.
132
 Id. at 482-83, 487-88. Burns was charged with attempted murder, but when her motion
to suppress the statements made under hypnosis was granted, the prosecution dropped all
charges, Id. at 483.
133 Id.
134
 Burns, 500 U.S. at 483. After the Bidder decision, most of the circuits denied absolute
immunity for investigative and administrative acts, but the circuits differed as to which acts fell
into those categories. Id. at 483 n.2. The Burns Court noted in particular the circuit split over
whether absolute immunity should or should not extend to the prosecutorial act of giving legal
advice to police. Id.
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ing. 135 The Court noted that at common law, witnesses, lawyers and
prosecutors had absolute immunity from liability for false or defama-
tory statements made during judicial proceedings, and that attorneys,
including prosecutors, had absolute immunity for eliciting false or
defamatory testimony.""' Finally, the Court adopted the same policy
justifications established in Imbler v. Pachtman, noting that appearance
at a probable cause hearing is clearly an advocatory function "inti-
mately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," as
well as a function connected with the initiation of a prosecution.'"
Yet, the Burns Court held further that when a prosecutor provides
legal advice to the police, or to other investigating officials, the prose-
cutor enjoys only qualified immunity.'" The Court noted the absence
of any historical or common law tradition of extending absolute im-
munity to this prosecutorial function.'" Absent a tradition of absolute
immunity, and without a clear intimate connection to the judicial
phase of the criminal process, the Court declined to extend the abso-
lute immunity.'" The Court also reasoned that the major policy con-
sideration underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity—the risk of
harassing litigation—is not present where a suspect would most likely
be unaware of the prosecutor's advice to the police.' 4 ' The Court also
pointed out that it would be incongruous to grant prosecutors absolute
immunity for giving advice to police while holding the police to a
qualified immunity standard for accepting and acting on that advice.' 42
The Court took the position that in order to make a useful dis-
tinction between investigatory and advocatory functions, courts would
have to determine the act's connection to the judicial process."' Oth-
erwise any pre-indictment prosecutorial act could be characterized as
related, however tenuously, to the prosecutor's decision to initiate a
criminal proceeding and could thereby share in the absolute protec-
138 Id. at 487. The Court carefully noted that Burns's claim did not question the prosecutor's
motivation for seeking the warrant or any acts outside of the hearing courtroom. Ift
181i Id. at 489-90.
137 Id. at 490-91,492 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). The judge before whom the probable
cause hearing was held testified that in her court only a prosecuting attorney could seek a warrant.
or authorize a warrant application, whereas police officers could not go directly to the court to
obtain a warrant. Id. at 491 n.7.
138 Id. at 496.
13" BUI7LC, 500 U.S. at 492.
140 Id. at 493.
141 Id. at 494.
142 Id. at 495. The Court also noted that since its decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800 (1982), qualified immunity provides greater, and therefore sufficient, protection for certain
official acts. Burns, 500 U.S. at 494 n.8.
" 3 Id. at 495.
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tion accorded to that decision." The Court did not, however, fully
discuss just how courts should go about characterizing and categoriz-
ing various prosecutorial functions as advocatory, administrative or
investigatory acts. The Burns Court simply established that prosecutors
will have absolute immunity only for advocatory acts closely associated
with the judicial process, and they will have only qualified immunity
for administrative and investigatory acts, such as giving advice to the
D. The Supreme Court's Prosecutorial Immunity Doctrine:
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons
In 1993, in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, the United States Supreme
Court offered further clarification by considering what level of immu-
nity should be accorded to prosecutorial acts during preliminary in-
vestigations and prosecutors' statements to the media." The Supreme
Court held that neither function was protected by absolute immunity. 147
Buckley involved a § 1983 claim alleging that a state prosecutor had
elicited a fabricated expert opinion and made false statements to the
media linking the plaintiff to the crime prior to his murder indict-
ment." The Court reasoned that neither function enjoyed absolute
immunity at common law and neither triggered the policy concerns
for burdening the criminal justice system. 149
 Thus, the Court held that
the prosecutor enjoyed only qualified immunity for the alleged acts.' 5( '
In Buckley, Stephen Buckley filed a § 1983 suit against seventeen
defendants, including Michael Fitzsimmons, the elected Illinois county
state's attorney, the assistant. state's attorney who prosecuted Buckley's
case and two assistant prosecutors also assigned to the case, claiming
that the prosecutors fabricated evidence and that Fitzsimmons made
false statements in a press conference announcing Buckley's arrest and
1+1 id
" 5
 Id. at 493, Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part. Id. at 496 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Scalia agreed with the
majority's determinations of immunity. but would have considered the prosecutor's institution of
the search warrant hearing as a possible independent constitutional violation under § 1983. Id.
at 496-97 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In accordance with the common
law, Scalia would find this inhiation of warrant proceedings entitled to only qualified immunity.
hi. at 497. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1 ' 1° See 509 U.S. 259, 261 (1993).
"7 See id. at 273-74, 277-78 (white, J., concurring).
1 ' 18 Id. at 262-64.
"9 Id. at 274 n.5, 275-79 (White, J., concurring).
150 M. at 273, 278 (White, J., concurring),
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indictment just twelve days before the primary election. Buckley
claimed that after three experts failed to match a bootprint left on the
victim's door to boots supplied by Buckley, the prosecutors sought the
opinion of a North Carolina anthropologist known for her willingness
to fabricate unfounded expert testimony.'" At the time these expert
opinions were being gathered, the murder investigation was being
conducted jointly by the sheriff's department and Fitzsimmons's prose-
cutors.' 55
 Buckley was indicted, arrested and held in jail for the ten
months preceding his trial, unable to meet his bond.'" A mistrial was
declared when the jury failed to reach a verdict, and Buckley remained
in jail for two more years, during which time a third party confessed
to the murder.''5
 It was only after the bootprint expert witness died that
the state's attorney dropped all charges, Buckley was released and the
1983 suit was filed. 15'
The district court hearing Buckley's § 1983 claim ruled that the
prosecutors had absolute immunity from the claim arising out of the
alleged fabrication of evidence, but that Fitzsimmons was not abso-
lutely immune from liability for his comments at the press confer-
ence.'" The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the
prosecutors had absolute immunity on both claims.' S 5 A unanimous
Supreme Court held that Fitzsimmons's statements to the media were
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 261-62. Buckley was charged in the highly publicized 1983 rape and
murder of an eleven-year-old girl and claimed that the press conference resulted in an even more
"inflamed" and prejudicial annosphere which affected the fundamental fitillICNN of his trial. Id.
Buckley argued that the intense publicity and public pressure to solve the crime, heightened in
Flizsimmons's case by the upcoming election, motivated the prosecutors' actions. Id.
152 Id. at 262,
trs /d.
15 " 1 Id. at '264.
In Id. The State's case consisted mainly of the testimony of the North Carolina anthropolo-
gist, who claimed that the print at the scene positively identified Buckley. Id. at 262.
158 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 264.
157 Id. The district court characterized the alleged fabrication of bootprint evidence as
comparable to the collection or evaluation of evidence leading up to the initiaticai of prosecution,
a protected function. See id. al 264-65, The Seventh Circuit took a novel approach and held that
where the constitutional injury occurs contemporaneous to the criminal proceeding, so that it
in effect only affects the continuation of' tlte case, then the prosecutor will have absolute immunity
antl the injured party can only seek a remedy cutting short or mitigating the criminal prosecution.
Id. at 265. In the view of the Seventh Circuit, the accused official has a qualified immunity only
where the constitutional injury is complete before the initiation of criminal proceedings, Id. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded Brickley to be reconsidered in light of the
intervening decision in Burns v. Reed, but the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its decision. huchky,
509 U.S. at 266. In Buckley, the Supreme Court criticized the Seventh Circuit for Incusing not on
the nature of the conduct lbr which immunity is claimed, but on the harm it inay have caused
within, or in the absence of, criminal proceedings. See id. at 271.
158 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 265.
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non-advocatory and, hence, not entitled to absolute immunity.' 59 A
five-to-four majority held that the alleged conspiracy to manufacture
false evidence was not advocatory and therefore not deserving of
absolute immunity.""'
On the issue of Fitzsimmons's liability for his statements to the
press, the Supreme Court noted that no absolute immunity existed at
common law for a prosecutor's out-of-court statements to the press.' 61
The common law immunity for defamatory statements was limited to
statements made in, and relevant to, judicial proceedings.' 62 Under the
functional approach set out in Imbler, the Buckley Court found no
functional connection between comments to the media and either
Fitzsimmons's role as advocate or the judicial process itself.'"
In addressing the issue of the prosecutor's fabrication of evidence
during the murder investigation, the Buckley Court implied that the
line between absolute and qualified immunity will not be drawn tem-
porally so that any advocatory act following initiation of proceedings
would be absolutely protected, while any pre-initiation act would have
only qualified protection.'" Instead, the Court, citing Inibler, expressly
recognized that some acts prior to the initiation of criminal process
and outside the courtroom will be accorded absolute immunity.'" 5
 The
Court stated that the crucial characterization is whether the function
in question was advocatory or non-advocatory.' 6° The Court concluded
that when a prosecutor conducts administrative acts or performs inves-
tigatory functions that do not relate to the advocatory preparation for
the initiation of prosecution or for trial itself, the prosecutor will
receive only qualified immunity.' 67 But, according to the Court, when
139 See id. at 277. The Court noted that it was not considering the issue of whether the
prosecutors would have qualified immunity, but Burns and other cases have recognized a pre-
sumption of qualified immunity for government officials. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 261: Burns v.
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991).
16° Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272, 282. The Chief Justice, Justice White and Justice Souter joined
Justice Kennedy in his dissent. Id. at 282 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161 Id. at 277. Buckley claimed that Fitzsimmons made false statements concerning the
bootprint evidence, released Buckley's mug shot to the media and otherwise linked Buckley to a
burglary ring which supposedly committed the murder, all of which inflamed and prejudiced the
public, depriving him of his right to a fltir trial. Id. at 276.-77.
162 Id. at 277.
163 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 277-78. Simply stated, The conduct of a press conference does not
involve the initiation of a prosecution, the presentation of the state's case in court, or actions
preparatory for these functions." Id. at 278.
164 See id. at. 272-73.
163 1d. at 272.
166 Id. at 272-73.
1 "7 See id. at 273.
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a prosecutor acts in an advocatory capacity in preparation for the
initiation of prosecution or for trial itself', the prosecutor will have
absolute immunity. 11i8 Such pre-initiation, pre-trial protected acts in-
clude the professional evaluation of evidence collected by law enforce-
ment officials and the preparation of that evidence for presentation at
trial, including interviewing Of witnesses. 16° The proper inquiry, accord-
Mg to the Buckley Court, focuses on whether the prosecutor was acting
in his capacity as advocate or in a capacity comparable to a law enforce-
ment officer investigating the crime. 17°
The Buckley Court concluded its analysis by establishing a seem-
ingly bright-line rule: a prosecutor does not. function as an advocate
prior to the existence of probable cause to arrest and hence will not
receive absolute immunity for acts done prior to the establishment of
probable cause.' 11 The Court observed that the existence of probable
cause does not ensure absolute immunity, for example where non-ad-
vocatory acts are performed after the initiation of prosecution. 172 Yet
the Buckley rule, drawn out to its logical conclusion, forecloses courts'
consideration of the nature of pre-probable cause prosecutorial activi-
ties on a case-by-case basis.'" Applying its analysis of the law to the facts
in Buckley, the Court stressed that the prosecutors' alleged manipula-
tion of the bootprint evidence occurred at an early stage in the inves-
tigatory process, well before probable cause existed.''' The Court noted
that the special grand jury had not yet been impaneled, and even when
impaneled, it functioned only as an investigatory body for the ten
months leading up to Buckley's indictment. 175 The Court concluded
that the fact that an indictment is returned at some point following
the alleged prosecutorial misconduct cannot retroactively transform
the nature of the alleged acts from administrative or investigatory to
advocatory. 17" Otherwise, the Court reasoned, a prosecutor could shield
himself or herself from liability simply by making certain the case was
brought to tria1. 177 The Buckley Court stated that the prosecutorial act.
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273.
165 Id
17" See id.
171 See id. at 274. The Court again noted that no analogous absolute immunity existed at
common law for fabrication of evidence at the preliminary investigation stage. Id. at 274-76.
172 See id. al 274 & n.5.
179
	 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 & n.5.
17 '1 /d. at 274-75.
175 1d. at 275.
176 Id. at 275-76.
177 1d. at 276. justice Kennedy agreed with tills reasoning, but suggested that "declining to
institute a prosecution likewise should not 'retroactively transform' work from the prosecutorial
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must be characterized according to its nature at the time it was per-
formed."" The Court held, therefore, that no prosecutorial act occur-
ring prior to the existence of probable cause to arrest can be consid-
ered advocatory, and consequently the prosecutor may only assert
qualified immunity for those pre-probable cause activities.' 79
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate opinion, joined by three other
justices, agreeing that statements to the press are entitled to only
qualified immunity, but rejecting the majority's bright-line rule.' 8" jus-
tice Kennedy stated that he would trust federal courts to apply the
Imbler functional test and weed out those instances where prosecutors
disguised administrative or investigatory acts as early acts of advocacy.' 81
Justice Kennedy would therefore find absolute immunity for truly
advocatory acts, such as the manipulation of expert testimony, even if
they occurred during the investigatory, pre-probable cause stage. 182
Kennedy expressed concern that denying absolute immunity prior to
probable cause would effectively destroy immunity protections, be-
cause plaintiffs could simply reframe their claims to cite the prepara-
tion leading to the alleged acts, thereby defeating the prosecutor's
absolute immunity defense. 18" Kennedy stated, furthermore, that where
absolute immunity shields the decision to use evidence at trial, it
should also shield the "steps leading to that decision," especially be-
cause the ultimate constitutional harm occurs during, and can there-
fore be remedied at, the criminal trial itself.'"
into the administrative," by automatically reducing the immunity available prior to that initiation.
Id. at 289-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178 See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274-75.
17° See id. justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment and the opinion
and approving of the bright-line pre-probable cause rule. See id. at 279-80 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Scalia questioned, however, the historical validity, or common law bases, of the generalization that
advocatory acts are entitled to absolute immunity, suggesting instead a more specific and detailed
inquiry into common law immunity doctrine and its justifications. Id. at '280-81 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Scalia also pointed out that the apparent vagueness in the functional approach is
diminished in practice, where each defendant hears die burden of proving an analogous corn-
mori-law immunity for each act in question. Id. at 281 (Scalia. J., concurring). Scalia noted that
where the common law basis is unclear, the defendant's immunity defense should simply fail. Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring).
18° Id. at 282,285-88 (Kennedy, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
181 Id. at 289-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182 See id. at 286-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in pail).
tai See Buckley, 283-85 (Kennedy, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184 See id. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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V. UNCERTAINTIES IN THE LAW OF PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
AFTER BUCKLEY
A. Potential Complication of the Investigative vs. Advocatory
Characterization
Although the Supreme Court's attempt to establish a bright-line
rule in Buckley may he seen as a small victory for individual rights, the
Supreme Court has still provided no precise guidelines for determin-
ing whether a prosecutorial act following the establishment of prob-
able cause to arrest is administrative or investigatory, or whether it is
advocatory.'"'' Some commentators have read Buckley as creating a
presumptive categorization of post-probable cause acts as advocatory
and hence deserving of absolute immunity. 186 This conclusion is un-
founded. The majority in Buckley explicitly states that probable cause
to arrest is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for advocatory
categorization.'"' The Buckley holding continues to call for a further
determination of whether a post-probable cause act was investigatory
or advocatory, presumably based on whatever guidance can be gleaned
from Imbler, Burns and Buckley.'"
But the Buckley decision might be viewed as undermining the
Court's previous functional approach to determining prosecutorial
immunity. Buckley states that no prosecutorial act is advocatory prior to
the time the prosecutor has probable cause to arrest.'" -`' The Burns Court
granted absolute immunity for appearing at a search warrant probable-
cause hearing following arrest.'`10 Yet the Buckley Court ultimately justifies
its bright-line rule by relying on the absence of a common law absolute
"Jr' See id. at 261. It has been well argued that Buckley will have a negative impact on the
prosecutorial function, and indeed criminal justice, especially at the federal level, where the
prosecutor's early and continued involvement in building often complex cases is seen as crucial.
See, e.g., Barrow, .supra note 3, at 324-26. To amass probable cause to arrest for a highly technical
white collar offense or criminal conspiracy, for example, may require the prosecutor's participa-
tion in the investigatory process to some extent. See id, ;it 324. It is unclear to what extent Buckley
has or will discourage such early prosecutorial involvement. 'rhe Supreme Court's response would
likely be that the modern qualified imm u nity doctrine provides sufficient protection for the
innocent prosecutor. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494-95 (1991).
1 '4  See, e.g., jefferey j. McKenna, Note, Prosecutorial Immunity: Imbler, Burns, and Now
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons — The Supreme Court's Attempt to Provide Guidance in a Difficult Area, 3
B,Y.U. L. Rev. 663, 691 (1994).
187 1 uckley, 509 U.S. at 274 n.5.
188 See id.
l" Id. at 274.
19°
 Burns, 500 U.S. at 492.
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immunity for pre-probable cause prosecutorial activities, giving little
effect to the functional analysis called for in Imbler and Burns.' 9 ' The
Court discusses the Imbler functional test and then leaps directly to the
conclusion that the act was investigative simply because it occurred
prior to probable cause to arrest, with no explanation of the analytical
process by which this conclusion was, or should be, reached. 192
Imbler and Burns made it clear that the crucial determination
would be whether the function was administrative or investigative, or
whether it was advocatory.'" Buckley makes it clear that this is no longer
always the test.'" Prior to Buckley, courts could find acts occurring
before probable cause to arrest, such as the evaluation of evidence, to
be advocatory in the classic sense.'" The Buckley decision introduces a
new and sharp distinction between the advocatory evaluation and
preparation of evidence for use at trial and the non-advocatory collec-
tion of evidence to support probable cause to arrest, a distinction the
Court would determine with reference to the existence or non-exist-
ence of probable cause.'" Yet it is possible to imagine a prosecutor
thinking in terms of the potential usefulness of certain evidence at trial
or pre-trial hearings after a suspect has been designated but before
probable cause has been amassed. It is especially easy to imagine such
a prosecutorial function on the federal level, where many prosecutions
involve highly complex cases built over lengthy periods.' 97
The Buckley Court presumably established the bright-line rule to
ease the reviewing court's task of determining the prosecutor's actual
motivation in individual cases.'" It is not clear, however, that the rule
will produce the correct result more often than not. Justice Kennedy
points out that one of the majority's reasons for the bright-line rule—to
ensure that prosecutors receive no greater protection than that awarded
to police engaged in the same investigatory acts—falsely assumes that,
prior to probable cause, prosecutors and investigators always perform
identical functions.'" As Kennedy points out, police and prosecutors
191 See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 n.5.
192 See id. at 273-74.
193 See Burns, 500 U.S. at 486; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31.
194 See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273-74 (stating bright-line rule that prosecutor does not function
as advocate prior to probable cause to arrest).
195 See id. at 287 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
' 96 See id. at 274.
197 See, e.g., id. at 290-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing
situation in which prosecutor may act as advocate prior to probable cause to arrest); Barrow,
supra note 3, at 325.
198
 See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273-74,
199 Id, at 288 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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may engage in an identical act, but for different purposes, as when the
police evaluate evidence to determine if there is probable cause to
arrest a suspect, and the prosecutor does so to determine if it will be
of use or persuasive at tria1. 20" Thus, reliance on the Buckley Court's
bright-line rule may produce correct results less often than individual-
ized consideration and determination of the nature of the prosecuto-
rial acts prior to the establishment of probable cause.
If Buckley tells us that some acts, otherwise considered advocatory,
are rendered non-advocatory by the point in time at which they are
performed, then to some extent the Imbler-Burns "intimate association
with the judicial phase of the criminal process" test has been under-
mined. 2" 1 Implicit in the pre-Buckley advocatory-non-advocatory formu-
lation was the notion that immunity is granted according to particular
functions and not according to either the official's office or the point
in the judicial process at which the act occurs. 202 In laying down a
temporal distinction over the pre-existing functional distinction, the
Court to some extent confuses the status of the law. 205
 In his separate
opinion, Justice Kennedy pointed out that prior to Buckley it was virtu-
ally unquestioned that absolute immunity extended to prosecutorial
acts which could form the basis of a common law malicious prosecu-
tion suit, even though a central part of a malicious prosecution claim
is the allegation that the prosecutor acted without probable cause. 204
The majority rule therefore seems to bar the absolute immunity de-
fense in a malicious prosecution-type claim, formerly the quintessential
case for absolute immunity, as long as a plaintiffs pleadings include
allegations of harm arising from some actions taken prior to a finding
of probable cause. 205
 Thus, although the ultimate characterization of
the particular function in question in Buckley as investigative may be a
reasonable determination, the Court's final pronouncement that prior
to probable cause a prosecutor does not act as an advocate has a weak
basis in the Supreme Court's prior prosecutorial immunity caselaw. 201'
"Id. (Kennedy, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2° 1
 /raider, 424 U.S. at 430.
202 Sergi Burns, 500 U.S. at 486; 'raider, 424 U.S. at 430-31,
2°3 See Barrow, supra note 3, at 324-25 ("EU t stands to reason that a prosecutor's observations
and evaluations are no different pre-probable cause than after probable cause. , here is
virtually no reason for the level of immunity to fluctuate on such a mere temporal basis.").
204
 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 286 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) „Justice Kennedy commented,
lind it rather strange that the classic case for the invocation of absolute immunity falls on the
unprotected side of the Court's new dividing line." Id. (Kennedy, concurring in part. and
dissenting in part).
206 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The Buckley decision leaves unsettled to what extent reference to the
timing of an alleged prosecutorial act will affect its characterization as
advocatory or non-advocatory.
B. Problems with the Buckley "Bright Line" Rule
Buckley held that a prosecutor is not, nor should consider himself
to be, an advocate before "he has" probable cause to have anyone
arrested. 207 Assuming that the Supreme Court intended this statement
to be interpreted literally, the Court provides no useful indication of
at what point probable cause will be "had" or who is to determine its
existence. The Supreme Court offers one hint by noting that a prose-
cutor would have absolute immunity for maliciously prosecuting some-
one he or she did not have probable cause to indict." But this state-
ment does little to clarify the ambiguities of the bright-line rule. The
Court only explains that absolute immunity was available at common
law for malicious prosecution claims while no such common law tradi-
tion exists for pre-probable cause investigative acts." The Supreme
Court has offered three types of justifications for grants of absolute
immunity—"intimate association" with the judicial phase of the crimi-
nal process, analogous common law immunity, and public po li cy. 210
The Buckley Court's reference to the common law to justify the appar-
ent anomaly between investigations without probable cause and prose-
cutions without probable cause, however, seems to ignore the two other
justifications.'" This is especially unsatisfying where the lower courts
determining the appropriate level of immunity have generally relied
most heavily on the de novo characterization of the prosecutorial acts
as advocatory or non-advocatory. 2 ' 2
In Buckley, the alleged manufacture of false evidence occurred
quite early in the investigative process, well before a grand jury was
even convened. 212 The Court did not have occasion to consider how
this rule would apply if the alleged misconduct had occurred later in
the process: for example, after the grand jury had been convened for
207 Id, at 274.
2" See id. at 274 n.5.
209 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 n.5.
210 See Burns, 500 U.S. at 489-92; Milder, 424 U.S. at 422-24, 430; see also Giuffi -e v. Bissell,
31 F.3c1 1241, 1252 (3d Cir. 1994) (identifying the three relevant inquiries as (])analogous
common law immunity; (2)risk of harassment or vexation litigation; and (3)alternatives to dam-
age suits for redressing of wrongful conduct).
211 See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 n.5.
212 See Burns, 500 U.S. at 491-92; hnhler, 424 U.S. at 430.
213 509 U.S. at 275.
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the purpose of considering an indictment but before actually issuing
a specific indictment. It therefore remains unclear whether it is enough
that the prosecutor has evidence that would be sufficient for an arrest
warrant, or whether the prosecutor must have already secured the
warrant or some other formal determination of probable cause. If the
former is the case, the Court has not indicated on what bases and
under what standard of review the court hearing the civil suit should
determine whether probable cause existed at the time of the alleged
misconduct. Not only does the Court not identify how formal the
finding of probable cause must be, but the Court also does not explain
who can or must determine the existence of probable cause and at
what point in the process—the prosecutor, a grand jury, or perhaps a
neutral magistrate during the initial criminal prosecution, or the court
hearing the § 1983 or Bivens claim. 2 '''
The Court also failed to address the post-probable cause, pre-in-
dictment situation. The Court did not make clear what level of immu-
nity would be accorded to pre-indictment acts when an appropriate
party has formally found probable cause prior to the alleged prosecu-
torial misconduct, but it is determined later in the process that prob-
able cause did not exist, and that the prosecutor was aware of this fact.
The Buckley Court suggests that indictment and post-indictment acts
enjoy absolute immunity because the common law recognized absolute
immunity for wrongful prosecution, that is, the prosecutorial decision
to initiate proceedings, with or without actual probable cause underly-
ing the indictment. 21 ' Yet Buckley simply does not explain if its bright-
line, pre-probable cause rule applies to the period following an improper
finding of probable cause and preceding that prosecutorial decision
to initiate proceedings. 21 " This seems a special concern where the party
initially determining probable cause may have based its finding on false
or misleading evidence intentionally submitted by the prosecutor. 2 " If
the police or the prosecutor knowingly supply a magistrate with false
or misleading evidence, the good faith exception may not apply, and
the warrant may well be found invalid on review. 2 ' 8 Yet if the prosecutor
214 Kenner, supra note 3, at 426.
215 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 n.5.
141 " See id. at 274.
217 See id. at 288 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Mt is difficult to
fathom why securing such a fraudulent determination transmogrifies unprotected conduct into
protected conduct.").
215 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). ln Leon, the Supreme Court created
the "good Faith exception," modifying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule so as not to bar
the prosecution's use of evidence seized in reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant
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remains absolutely immune from civil liability for submitting such
evidence to receive a formal finding of probable cause, then the prose-
cutor may still have some incentive to secure an arrest warrant as early
as possible in the criminal process. 219 The Supreme Court does not
address these issues, and it is not even clear after Buckley whether a
prosecutor would have absolute immunity for acts committed during
a probable cause hearing itself, where the immediate outcome of the
hearing is a finding that probable cause is lacking.22° In sum, the
Buckley decision appears to lessen, to some extent, the protections
previously afforded prosecutors through the defense of absolute im-
munity, but it is unclear from the decision itself how exactly the impo-
sition of the bright-line, pre-probable cause guideline affects immunity
doctrine."' It is this very lack of clarity that has enabled the federal
courts to bring their own interpretations, both explicit and implicit, to
bear on the law of prosecutorial immunity. 222
VI. PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE AS INTERPRETED BY THE
LOWER FEDERAL COURTS: INTERPRETATIONS OF BUCKLEY'S
BRIGHT- LINE RULE
Several federal circuit courts have already considered prosecuto-
rial immunity cases in which the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the
prosecutors acted without probable cause to arrest.'" The consensus
seems to be that a reviewing court's determination that probable cause
to arrest was actually lacking at the time of the alleged prosecutorial
acts does not implicate the Buckley bright-line rule or preclude advo-
catory categorization, as long as the prosecutorial acts followed an
official, albeit mistaken, determination of probable cause. 224 Further-
more, absolute immunity will probably not be withheld for otherwise
advocatory acts performed during the arrest warrant probable cause
hearing itself, even when the immediate outcome of the hearing is a
finding of no probable cause. 22'
later found to have lacked probable cause. Id. at 922. The Leon Court specifically retained
suppression as the appropriate remedy in three situations, one of which is when the magistrate
is misled by information which the affiant "knew was false or would have known was false except
for his reckless disregard or the truth." Id. at 923.
219 See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 286 (Kennedy, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
2'° See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
221 See id. at 274.
222 See infra notes 223-338 and accompanying text.
223 See, e.g., Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3(1 653 (2d Cir. 1995); Kohl v. Casson, 5 E3d 1141
(8th Cir. 1993).
224 See, e.g., Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 191, 192-95 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Reid v. State of New
Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332, 336-38, 341 (1st Cir. 1995); Kola, 5 F.Sti at 1145-46.
225 See Kohl, 5 F.3r1 at 1146.
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In effect, the potential impact of the Buckley holding has yet to be
realized by the federal circuit courts. Not only does the bright-line rule
only apply to instances in which the prosecutor acts prior to an official
determination of probable cause, but also it does not seem to have any
effect on the application of immunity analysis outside of this narrow
situation. 226
 When Buckley has not been implicated, the courts have
analyzed immunity issues and distinguished advocacy from investiga-
tion and administration under the pre-existing Imbler functional ap-
proach. 227
 Thus, while the Buckley Court's written opinion seemed to
diverge from the pattern of analysis and reasoning established by Burns
and Imblerso as to increase prosecutorial liability, Buckley's actual effect
appears surprisingly minima1. 228
In September 1993, in Kohl v. Casson, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered what immunity should be
accorded to prosecutorial acts undertaken during a period in which
the existence of actual probable cause was disputed and ultimately held
that the acts were advocatory and deserving of absolute immunity.'"
The court did not consider the lack of probable cause, determined
twice in separate pre-trial hearings, as affecting the application of
immunity doctrine.2s" The Eighth Circuit seems instead to have implic-
itly adopted the view that Buckley's bright-line rule does not preclude
absolute immunity when probable cause is found lacking following the
occurrence of the alleged wrongful acts."' Hence Buckley did not affect
the reviewing court's subsequent application of immunity doctrine,
even where the plaintiff claimed that the prosecutor committed the
acts knowing that probable cause was lacking."'
Kohl was arrested pursuant to a warrant for the theft of a bag
containing checks and $3,000 in cash from a van parked outside a
restaurant.'" The prosecutor filed a felony theft charge against Kohl,
and law enforcement officials seized approximately $2,000, his car and
other property, resulting in Kohl's inability to post bail. 2
 '^ After a
preliminary hearing in April 1990, the county court ruled that the state
had failed to show probable cause that Kohl had committed the crime."'
226 See Buckley,*ley 509 U.S. at 274; see also discussion infra notes 229-338 and accompanying text.
227 See discussion infra notes 229-338 and accompanying text.
228 See discussion infra mites 229-338 and accompanying text.
l29 5 F.3d at 1145.
23° See id. at 1145-47.
251 .See Kohl, 5 F.3d at 1145-47.
2.5`2
	 id.
255
 Id. m 1143-44.
254
 Id. at 1144.
255 Id.
1048	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 37:1019
The prosecutor refiled the charges, and a month later, the state dis-
trict court again found probable cause lacking and ordered Kohl's
releasef236
 Kohl filed a § 1983 claim alleging that the investigating
officer and prosecutor had arrested and detained him without prob-
able cause. 237
 Specifically, Kohl claimed that the prosecutor initiated
prosecution while knowing he lacked probable cause to arrest, advised
the police on the preparation of the affidavit and then presented it to
the magistrate as true and sufficient while knowing he lacked probable
cause, and advised the police not to return the money seized from
Koh 1. 235
The Eighth Circuit held the prosecutor absolutely immune to the
malicious prosecution claim by reasoning that the acts in question were
of the type concerning the initiation of prosecution awarded advoca-
tory status in Imbler. 239
 The court also granted absolute immunity for
withholding the money, because during the time it was withheld it
constituted potential evidence that might be used if Kohl's prosecution
commenced."" On both these issues the court failed to consider whether
the plaintiffs claim that the prosecutor lacked probable cause had any
effect on the Imbler functional analysis."'
Nor did the court consider the impact of the lack of probable
cause on the question of the prosecutor's involvement in the applica-
tion for the arrest warrant. 242
 The court held, rather, that a prosecutor's
presentation of an affidavit supporting a warrant application to a
magistrate is entitled to absolute immunity insofar as the prosecutor
simply presents the evidence and argues the law. 243 The court reasoned
that seeking an arrest warrant should not be treated differently from
seeking a search warrant, a function held to be advocatory in Burns. 244
To the extent, however, that a prosecutor "vouches, of his own accord"
for the truth of the affidavit, the Eighth Circuit held that he or she is
only entitled to qualified immunity under the 1986 United States
Supreme Court decision in Malley v. Briggs, which the court construed
as granting only qualified immunity for the function of vouching for
the truth of the complaint in seeking an arrest warrant. 24 ''
236 Kohl, 5 F.3(.1 at 1144.
237 M. The federal district court denied absolute immunity to the prosecutor, who then
appealed this decision to the circuit court. Irl. at 1145.
2 '9' 8 Id. at 1195, 1147.
2" Id. at 1145.
21° Id. at 1147.
2 ' 11 See. Kohl, 5 E.3d al 1145-47.
242 See, id. at 1145-46.
243 Id. at 1146.
2 " Id.
215 Id. (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)). The court then concluded that the
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Thus, the Eighth Circuit, seems to have implicitly held that the
absence of actual probable cause does not alter the application of
pre-Buckley immunity doctrine."'" The prosecutor enjoys absolute im-
munity for his or her actions during the probable cause hearing itself,
to the extent that he or she does not personally attest to the truth and
sufficiency of the evidence presented, even when it is determined
relatively shortly after the alleged acts that probable cause was lack-
ing.247
 This result occurs even where the plaintiff's pleadings specifically
included the claim that the prosecutor committed the alleged acts,
such as presenting the warrant application, knowing that he or she
lacked probable cause to arrest.'"
It may be that the Eighth Circuit used the Malley exception, for
the prosecutor's personal attestation to the truth of the affidavits sup-
porting the warrant application, as a means of increasing prosecutorial
liability where a prosecutor acts with the knowledge that he or she lacks
probable cause, thereby implicitly interpreting Buckley as extending
liability to situations prior to an official determination of probable
cause. 219
 But the Eighth Circuit only cited Malley as applicable to the
prosecutor's vouching for the truth of the affidavits, not vouching for
the sufficiency of the warrant application or the existence of probable
cause. 25" Thus, it seems likely that the Eighth Circuit based this part of
its holding relying solely on Malley without Buckley affecting the deter-
mination. 25 '
In 1995, in Reid v. New Hampshire, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held that two prosecutors were absolutely
immune from suit on charges that they had withheld exculpatory
evidence in violation of a court's disclosure order. 252 In Reid, the plain-
tiff had been arrested in June 1986, without a warrant, and charged
with three counts of felonious sexual assault on a six-year-old gir1. 253
Following a probable cause hearing, Reid was bound over for trial. 254
He represented himself at trial, filed five successful motions to compel
prosecutor hall met ilte qualified immunity standard in presenting the affidavit as true since
"reasonable ()Ulcers could disagree whether probable cause in fact existed," Id. at 1147. The court
also ham(' the prosecutor's advice to the police officer on the preparation of the affidavit to be
entitled to qualified immunity. LI,
2" See Kohl, 5 F.3(1 at 1145-47.
217 See id. at 1146-47.
218 See id. at 1145.
24a
	 id. at 1145-47,
2" M. at 1146.
251 See Kohl, 5 F,3(1 al 1146.
252 56 F.3(1 332, 336-37 (1st Cir, 1995).
253 Id. at 333-34.
251 Id. at 334.
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disclosure of exculpatory evidence, personally cross-examined the State's
witnesses and succeeded in having the jury acquit on one count. 255
Thereafter, he moved to have the convictions on the other two
counts set aside, and in response to another motion to disclose excul-
patory evidence, the State turned over documents undermining the
testimony of the alleged victims, her sister and mother. 256 The superior
court hearing Reid's motion concluded that this evidence, including
a report prepared by the investigating officer and a file maintained by
the New Hampshire Child Welfare Agency, constituted exculpatory
impeachment evidence.'" Consequently, in October 1988, the court
set aside the two convictions and ordered a new tria1. 258 In December
1988, all charges against Reid were dropped. 259
Reid filed his original civil rights complaint in federal district
court claiming, inter alia, that the two prosecutors in his case caused
him to be deprived of his liberty without probable cause, and that they
withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of his constitutional rights. 26°
He also alleged that the police arrested him on the basis of unreliable
information. 26 ' The district court magistrate recommended that the
claims against the prosecutors be dismissed on the grounds of absolute
prosecutorial immunity, and the district court adopted the recommen-
dation. 262 On appeal, the First Circuit held that the prosecutors' with-
holding of exculpatory evidence, even in direct violation of court
orders to disclose, was clearly deserving of absolute immunity under
Imbler, which provided that level of immunity for the knowing suppres-
sion of exculpatory information, even if specifically requested by the
defense.2" In response to Reid's argument that the court orders to
disclose had displaced any prosecutorial discretion which would impli-
255 Id.
256 Id,
257 Reid, 56 F.3d at 334.
258
259 Id.
26° Id. Reid filed three amended complaints which further developed and altered his char-
acterization of the prosecutors' acts, Id. at 335-36. The third amended complaint Finally alleged
that the prosecutors knew of the exculpatory evidence but failed to disclose it to defense counsel
or, in the alternative, they disclosed the evidence to defense counsel but enlisted him in a
conspiracy to conceal that evidence from the defendant and the court. Id. at 336.
261 Id. at 334.
262 Reid, 56 F.3d at 335. The district court dismissed the claims against the prosecutors
Following the filing of the First amended complaint. Id. The second amended complaint did not
mention the prosecutors, but Reid reasserted his prosecutorial misconduct claims in the third
amended complaint, which the district court refused to adopt insofar as it renewed the claims
against the prosecutors. Id. at 336, 339.
262 Id. at 336-37,
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cate the policy concerns underlying immunity doctrine, the court
reasoned that the prosecutors retained the discretionary task of deter-
mining what evidence qualified for disclosure under the court's broad
request for exculpatory evidence. 264
 The First Circuit further held that
the prosecutors' acts of repeatedly misleading the trial court to conceal
their withholding of the evidence was subject to absolute immunity
because Burns granted absolute immunity for false and defamatory
statements made during, and related to, judicial proceedings. 26'
Yet the First Circuit did not consider what effect Reid's claim that
there was no probable cause to arrest had upon the prosecutors'
immunity. 2"" The court dealt with the issue by summarily noting that
Reid's claim failed to implicate the prosecutors in the arrest, and
therefore Reid failed to state a false arrest claim against them. 2 "7 Yet
when the First Circuit ultimately considered the false arrest claim
against the police officers, it questioned the district court's finding that
an objectively reasonable police officer, based on all the evidence
including that withheld, could have believed there was probable cause
to arrest Reid.268 In reversing the district court's grant of summary
judgment as to the police officers, the First Circuit noted that Reid was
entitled to submit interrogatories to the police defendants to deter-
mine when they learned of the exculpatory evidence. 26• The court
reasoned that the timing of their knowledge was relevant to whether
they could have reasonably believed they had probable cause and to
whether the police officers initiated the prosecution knowing that they
lacked probable cause. 27"
The First Circuit explicitly cast doubt on the existence of probable
cause underlying Reid's arrest and the initiation of his prosecution. 271
Yet the court never suggested that a finding on remand that probable
cause had been lacking would recharacterize the prosecutors' actions
264 Id. at 337. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence fiworable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment." 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The Brady rule
requires disclosure to the defendant in a criminal case of evidence that is both favorable to the
defendant and material either to guilt or sentencing. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674
(1985). The Supreme Court has held that "material" evidence is evidence that "might have
affected the outcome of the trial." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
265 Reid, 56 F.3d at 337.
266 Id, to 335, 336-38.
207 Id, to 336.
268 Id. at 341.
Id, at 341-42.
270 Reid, 56 F.3d at 341-42.
271 1d. at 341.
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as non-advocatory. 272 While Buckley's bright-line rule could arguably
support a conclusion that the post-trial finding of an initial and con-
tinuing lack of probable cause to arrest rendered the prosecutors' trial
activities subject only to qualified immunity, the First Circuit granted
absolute immunity without addressing this possibility. 273
 Instead, the
court seemed to focus on the Imbler functional test, holding that an
activity so intimately connected in time and nature to the trial itself
must be advocatory. 27' Thus, the First Circuit appears to have inter-
preted the Buckley bright-line rule as not precluding advocatory char-
acterization where there has been an official finding of probable cause,
even if that finding may have been tainted by the withholding of
exculpatory evidence.`"
In 1995, in Moore v. Valder, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit appeared to agree that the fact that a
reviewing court determines that probable cause was actually lacking at
the time of the alleged prosecutorial acts does not alter the application
of the pre-Buckley immunity analysis. 276 Moore had been indicted in
1988 on multiple counts of theft and fraud in connection with a
scheme to defraud the federal government. 277 He was charged, inter
alia, with persuading an executive search company president, who had
been hired by the U.S. Postal Service to identify candidates for Post-
master General, to recommend a candidate who favored using a type
of address-scanner marketed by Moore's corporation. 278 At the close of
the government's case, Moore's motion for a judgment of acquittal was
272 See id. at 336,342.
273 See id. at 336: see also Buckle), 509 U.S. at 274 ("A prosecutor neither is, nor should
consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.").
274 See Reid, 56 F.3d at 336-37.
275 See id.; see also Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 55 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1995). 1n Guzman -Rivera,
another prosecutorial immunity case, the First Circuit held three prosecutors ex officio absolutely
immune from suit under Imbler for their failure to go to court to undo a wrongful conviction,
but granted only qualified immunity for their actions during the post-conviction reinvestigation
of the case. Guzman -Rivera, 55 F.3d at 28,30-31, The First Circuit analogized to the situation in
Buckley, describing the case before it as "mirroring" that in Buckley in the post-trial context, to
justify its withholding of absolute immunity. Id. at 30. Because the prosecutors were merely acting
as investigators hit the civil rights division, and because no post-conviction proceeding was yet
pending, the court held that the acts were investigatory in nature. See id. Arguably, the same result
would have been dictated by the Imbler Functional approach, even in the absence of Buckley, where
the prosecutor-defendants did not handle the underlying prosecution and were investigating a
civil rights complaint not only as advocates for the state but also on Guzman's behalf. See id.
276 Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189,191,192-95 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
277 1d. at 191.
278 Id.
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granted on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence that Moore
knew of such a scheme. 279
Moore then filed a Givens claim in federal district court against
the prosecutor and others for malicious and retaliatory prosecution.'"
Specifically, Moore claimed that the prosecutor, knowing Moore was
unaware of the fraud, initiated prosecution in retaliation for his criti-
cisms of Postal Service procurement policies and his recommendations
to the President of the United States of certain candidates for Postmas-
ter General. 28" In this complaint, and in a separate complaint filed
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act and later
consolidated with the first, Moore claimed that the prosecutor had
stated, in the presence of a grand jury witness, that he did not care if
Moore was actually guilty because he wanted a "high-profile" indict-
ment, that he intimidated and coerced witness testimony, that he
presented this misleading testimony to the grand jury while concealing
exculpatory evidence and that he disclosed grand jury testimony to
third parties. 282
The D.C. Circuit granted only qualified immunity for the intimi-
dation and coercion of witnesses and the disclosure of grand jury
testimony to third parties. 2" The court reasoned that witness interviews
are advocatory when designed to explore "whether witness testimony
is truthful and complete and whether the government has acquired all
incriminating evidence," and the abuse of that function by the prose-
cutor rendered the act investigatory. 284 The court analogized the dis-
closure of grand jury testimony to third parties to the statements to
the press that received only qualified immunity in Bucidey. 285
The court, however, granted the prosecutor absolute immunity
from suit for his decision to prosecute Moore, concealment of excul-
patory evidence from the grand jury, manipulation of evidence before
the grand jury and withholding of exculpatory evidence after indict-
ment and before tria1. 286 The D.C. Circuit bolstered its holding by citing
279 Id.
280 Id.
2g1 Moore, 65 F.3d at 191.
282m. at
 191-92. Prior to transferring the remaining claims to the District Court for the
District of Columbia for lack of personal jurisdiction, the District Court for the Northern District
of Texas dismissed the claims against the prosecutor on the grounds of absolute immunity. M.
at 192.
283
 Id. at 194-95.
284 Id. at 194. The court concluded that the witness intimidation "therefore related to a typical
police function, the collection of information to be used in a prosecution," Id.
'20
 Id. at 195.
2811 Moore, 65 F.3d at 194.
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to the Second Circuit's decision in Hill v. City of New York, to support
the proposition that absolute immunity attaches to the withholding of
exculpatory evidence from the grand jury. 287 The court then cited to
both Hill and the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Carter v. .Burch, for the
proposition that absolute immunity is accorded to the post-indictment
withholding of exculpatory evidence from defense counse1. 288 It seems
then that the D.C. Circuit has approved, and possibly implicitly adopted,
the Second Circuit's reasoning that the absence of actual probable
cause will not destroy absolute immunity for post-initiation/pre-indict-
ment or post-indictment acts otherwise considered advocatory under
the hnbterfunctional approach. 289 To that extent, the D.C. Circuit seems
to agree that the lack of actual probable cause, determined on review,
does not affect the application of pre-existing immunity doctrine. 29°
By citing Carter for the broad proposition that absolute immunity
attaches to the withholding of exculpatory evidence from defense
counsel, the D.C. Circuit also implicitly approved the Fourth Circuit's
more narrow and questionable holding that absolute immunity would
attach to any withholding of exculpatory evidence that followed the
suspect's arrest. 291 But a stronger interpretation of Moore finds the D.C.
Circuit merely extending the absolute immunity accorded to the post-
indictment withholding of evidence under Imbler to the same act per-
formed during the pre-indictment stage. 292 It thus appears that the D.C.
Circuit has not allowed the issue of actual probable cause raised by
Buckley to bear on the application of immunity doctrine in the post-in-
itiation context, even where the plaintiffs case is predicated on a claim
of baseless, retaliatory prosecution and where the initiation proceed-
ings were tainted by the prosecutor's manipulation of the evidence. 293
In a few instances to date, the Buckley holding has affected the
outcomes in prosecutorial misconduct cases, indicating the narrow, but
undeniable reach of the Buckley decision.294 In 1994, in Hummel-Jones
v. Strode, the Eighth Circuit considered a situation in which the chal-
287 See id.; see also Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653,661-62 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussed infra
notes 313-32 and accompanying text).
288 See Moore, 65 F.3d at 194; see also Hill, 45 F.3d at 662 (discussed infra notes 313-32 and
accompanying text): Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257,262 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1101
(1995) (discussed infra note 332). Both Hill and Carter were decided after Buckley.
2" See Moore, 65 F3d at 194.
2" See id.
29 I See id.; see also Carter, 34 F.3d at 262.
'2112 See Moore, 65 F.3d at 194. The court stated that It follows from lathier that the failure, he
it knowing or inadvertent, to disclose material exculpatory evidence befitre trial also falls within
the protection afforded by absolute prosecutorial immunity." Id.
295 See id. at 191,192-95.
29.1 See Hill v. New York, 45 F.3d 653 (2d Cir. 1995); Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257 (4th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1101 (1995); Hummeljones v. Strope, 25 F,3d. 647 (8th Cir. 1994).
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lenged prosecutorial acts not only took place in the complete absence
of probable cause to arrest but also in a context in which the plaintiffs
were not even the intended targets of the prosecutorial inquiry. 2"5 The
court held that the prosecutors were only entitled to a qualified immu-
nity defense for their participation in a search that violated the rights
of a couple who were not the nominal subject of the search. 2`j6
 The
Eighth Circuit cited Buckley for the denial of absolute immunity in this
context, adopting Buckley's reasoning that in the absence of probable
cause to arrest, the prosecutor's search for evidence must be consid-
ered investigatory. 29`7
Hummel-Jones, her husband and toddler were staying at a birth-
ing clinic following the birth of their child. 298 An investigator for the
local Board of Healing Arts became convinced that the nurse at the
clinic was delivering a baby without a license to practice medicine and
contacted the local sheriff. 2J" An off-duty deputy posed as a United
States serviceman with car trouble to gain admittance to the clinic and
then used the phone to call waiting officers and inform them of the
presence of the newborn infant.") Later that same night, officers got
the local prosecutor to prepare an application for a search warrant,
and a magistrate issued the warrant, though the affidavit included only
conclusory statements and referred to the off-duty sheriff only as a
"confidential informant," not describing the way in which he gained
access to the clinic."' At 2 A.M., four armed officers, two prosecutors
and the Board inspector raided the clinic, and over the course of three
and a half hours, detained, questioned and photographed the family
members, searched Hummel-Jones's bag without consent, and seized
banking slips and a videotape."' The couple subsequently filed suit
under § 1983 claiming that the participants in the raid violated the
couple's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by conducting an
unlawful search and seizure."'
The Eighth Circuit noted that the prosecutors were not entitled
to absolute immunity for their participation in the search and would
295 See 25 F.3(1 at 649.
296 1d. at 649, 653 n.10.
297 See Hummel-Jones, 25 F,3d at 653 n.10 (construing Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273-74).
298 Hummel tones, '25 F.3d at 649.
29 Id.
500 id.
"I Id.
302 1d.
3°3
 Hummeljone,c, 25 F.3d at 650. The district court granted summary judgment to all the
defendants, and the couple appealed both the finding that there was no constitutional violation
and the finding that the defendants were protected by qualified immunity. Id.
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be held to the qualified immunity standard?'" In considering whether
the defendants had met the qualified immunity standard, the court
held that no objectively reasonable law enforcement officer could have
believed that the search met the Fourth Amendment's basic reason-
ableness requirement.305 The court reasoned that not only was the
conduct of the search unreasonable, but the possession of a warrant
did not excuse or mitigate that unreasonableness, especially where
the warrant application did not mention the family's presence at the
clinic. 30" The court held, thus, the prosecutors were not entitled to
summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity and
would have to go to trial on the merits of Hummel-Jones's claim."'
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the denial of absolute prosecu-
torial immunity was a result clearly dictated by Bucklq. 308 Indeed, Hum-
meljones presents a clear example of the type of situation to which the
Buckley bright-line rule apparently applies. 309 The defendant-prosecu-
tors never claimed that they had probable cause to arrest anyone prior
to the search, and they certainly had no reason to suspect the couple
of any wrongdoing.'"" As part of the search party, the prosecutors, so
far as the facts indicate, performed a function identical to that of the
law enforcement officers. ' Yet Hummel-fones raised no issue as to the
timing of the probable cause determination and therefore did not
require the court to explore the boundaries of the Buckley bright-line
rule. 312
In 1995, in Hill v. City of New York, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit considered a § 1983 suit against a
prosecutor which included the claim he coerced witness testimony
5114 See id. at 652, 653 n.10. The court also noted that there remained material questions of
fact as to who "participated in, ordered, or condoned" the particular acts, allegedly committed
during the search. Id. at 653 B. 10.
305 Id. at 653.
"liird. at (150, 651. The court noted that the search was conducted during the night primarily
to ensure the fitmily's presence on the premises. Id. at 650. The withholding of this information
therefore prevented the magistrate from considering the family's privacy interests when issuing
the warrant. Id. at 1351.
307 Id. at 653.
3"14 Hummeljorms, 25 F.3d at 653 n.10.
"See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274; Horn 	 25 F.3d at 649-50.
110 See /Runnel-Jones, 25 F.3d at 649; .see also Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 (holding a prosecutor's
acts non advocatory prior to existence of probable cause to arrest). The court wisely noted that
"giving birth, of c4mrse, is not illegal." Ilummellones, 25 F.3d at 649 n.4.
See thimmellones, 25 F.3d at 1149, 4153 n.10; see also Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273-74 (noting
that qualified immunity is appropriate where the prosecutor perlbrms an investigative function
normally performed by law enforcement detectives).
s 11 See Ilummellones, 25 F.3d at 649-50.
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during videotaped interviews prior to, and in pursuit of, probable
cause to arrest:413
 The court, faced with a more difficult and telling
situation in which the alleged prosecutorial acts occurred as probable
cause was being amassed, gave limited effect to the Buckley bright-line
rule and noted that the prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immu-
nity for the interviews if those interviews were conducted in the absence
of probable cause to arrest Hill and for the purpose of securing evidence
to establish that probable cause. 3" Yet the Second Circuit did not
suggest that the post-indictment realization that probable cause had
been lacking in any way threatened the absolute immunity accorded
to the prosecutor's post-arrest acts, including withholding exculpatory
evidence from the grand jury. 313
Hill claimed that an assistant district attorney and other defen-
dants engaged in a conspiracy to manufacture false evidence against
her in connection with the investigation of alleged sexual abuse of her
five-year-old son.316
 Specifically, Hill charged that. when the prosecutor
had received contradictory accounts of the abuse from the victim he
manufactured probable cause against Hill by coaching the child's
testimony in two videotaped interviews. 31 Hill claimed that when, dur-
ing the first taped session, the child named his former foster brother
as his abuser, the prosecutor abruptly ended the session.'" The second
taped interview, during which the prosecutor had allegedly encour-
aged the child to name his mother, was used to establish probable
cause to arrest and indict Hill.'" The prosecutor did not inform the
grand jury of the existence or content of the first tape, and he sub-
sequently filed two court documents stating that no exculpatory evi-
dence existed. 32° Only after a copy of the first interview was mistakenly
sent to Hill's counsel was the indictment dismissed. 32 ' A year later, Hill
filed suit under § 1983, claiming the prosecutor had manufactured
evidence to establish probable cause to arrest her. 322
The Second Circuit held that the prosecutor had only qualified
immunity for directing that Hill's children be removed from their
31 s45 14'.3d 653,658 (2d Cir. 1995).
314 Sef! id. at 662-63.
315
 See id. at 661-62.
516 /d. at 656.
317
313Hill, 45 F.3. at 658.
319 Id. at 658.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id. at 656. The Second Circuit's Hill decision is the defendants' appeal, following the
district court's denial of their motion to dismiss. Id. at 659.
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home, for telling the police they had probable cause to arrest Hill, and
for the videotaped interviews, but the prosecutor had absolute immu-
nity for the post-arrest acts of alleged malicious prosecution, withhold-
ing evidence from the grand jury and withholding Brady evidence from
the court. 323
 The court reasoned that the pre-arrest acts of ordering
the children's removal and advising the police were both investigatory
under Burns, not because they occurred prior to the existence of
probable cause, but because they were non-advocatory under the func-
tional approach. 324
 The court also found that the misconduct before
the grand jury and the court was advocatory and thus protected by
absolute immunity under Imbler and Burns. 323
The court referred, however, to Buckley to decide the issue of the
taped interviews. 32" The Second Circuit reasoned that even though the
time frame was much more collapsed in the instant case than it had
been in Buckley, the fact that the tape was used to establish probable
cause dispositively demonstrated that the act of making the tape oc-
curred before probable cause to arrest existed. 327 Hence, the court held
that the act was non-advocatory and subject only to qualified immu-
n i ty.328
Interestingly, at no time did the court use Buckley to suggest that
the prosecutorial acts following the official determination of probable
cause were tainted by the actual lack of probable cause. 329 Thus, the
Second Circuit, along with the Eighth Circuit in Kohl v. Casson and the
D.C. Circuit in Moore v. Valder, appears to have interpreted Buckley as
holding that a prosecutor does not act as an advocate prior to the time
someone has secured an official determination of probable cause to
arrest.'" The Second Circuit implicitly reasoned that once probable
cause has been officially recognized, as by the issuance of an arrest
warrant or the finding of a probable cause hearing, subsequent prose-
cutorial acts will be reviewed under the pre-existing, apparently un-
changed Imbler-Burris functional analysis."' This appears to be true
even if that official determination of probable cause is later found to
have been based on incomplete evidence. 332
323 Ha 45 F.3d at 661,662.
324 See id. at 661.
325 .50> id.
326 M. at 662.
327 Id.
323 Hilt 45 F.3d at 662-63.
329 See id, at 661-63.
330 SPE td. ; supra notes 229-51,276-93 (discussing Kohl and Moore).
n See Hill, 45 12.3d at 661-63.
332 See id. at 658; see also Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
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It is clear that the federal circuit courts have yet to fully define the
contours of the Buckley decision. But while no circuit court has explic-
itly questioned or criticized any aspect of Buckley, they have collectively
revealed a pattern of mostly implicit interpretation that suggests Buck-
ley will be read narrowly—so narrowly that whatever change to immu-
nity doctrine it purported to make has largely been vitiated.'" It is likely
that the only situation in which the Buckley bright-line rule will supply
the dispositive analysis is when challenged prosecutorial acts occur in
the absence of any official determination of probable cause. 334 Since
most prosecutorial functions take place after arrest, relatively few fact
patterns should include cognizable claims of prosecutorial misconduct
absent an official determination. Those acts that do occur prior to a
formal probable cause determination will often relate to the prosecu-
tor's participation in investigations. If this is the conduct at which the
Buckley bright-line rule was aimed, then to a considerable extent Buck-
ley seems only to reinforce a result already commanded by Imbler and
Burns. 335
What Buckley adds to existing immunity doctrine is perhaps no
more than the reasoning that acts undertaken prior to an official
determination of probable cause to arrest are likely always to be non-
advocatory under a functional analysis because they lack any certain
link to a judicial proceeding already begun and certain to take place.'
in effect, this amounts to a mere gloss on the pre-existing Imbler
functional analysis. 3" Though it is unclear whether the apparent vitia-
tion of Buckley's holding should be attributed to the federal circuit
courts, or to the United States Supreme Court for its drafting of an
ambiguous decision, it seems, as of this date, that Buckley's dramatic
reception was premature and ultimately unwarranted." 8
I [01 (1995). The Fourth Circuit deciding Carter appeared to apply post-Buckley immunity dire-
trine much like the Second Circuit, reverting to the pre-existing hnbler-Burns functional deter-
mination for any act falling on the judicial-process side of the if/Miley bright-line. See Carter, 34
F.3d at 262-63 (citing Imbler For grant of absolute immunity for withholding exculpatory evidence
before trial). The Carter court, however, intimated that arrest demarcates that line, rather than
the official determination of probable cause. See id. at 262 ("the alleged fabrication of evidence
occurred before an arrest, and thus before the judicial process had been implicated") (emphasis
added).
333 See supra notes '229-332 and accompanying text.
334 See supra notes 229-33'2 and accompanying text.
"5 See Burns, 500 U.S. at 493 (holding that advising police during investigatory phase is not
advocatory); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430,431 n.33 (withholding absolute immunity for an act not an
integral part of judicial process).
3:u;
	 509 U.S. at '274.
3" See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 431 n.33 (recognizing possibility of non-advocatory charac-
terization of prosecutorial acts prior to initiation of prosecution).
3" See discussion supra parts 1V--V.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons was
heralded as cutting back on what had historically been a highly deferen-
tial doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity by imposing a bright-
line rule on the pre-existing functional approach of bible?: no act can
or should be considered advocatory prior to the time the prosecutor
has probable cause to arrest.'" On its face, this rule appears to contra-
dict the reasoning underlying previous prosecutorial immunity deci-
sions, to create ambiguities as to the proper application of immunity
doctrine, and certainly to withhold absolute immunity in circumstances
where it previously had been assured. Whatever opportunity Buckley
offered, however, to federal courts anxious to cutback on prosecutorial
privileges has not yet been seized. The federal courts have not used
Buckley's arguably ambiguous holding to significantly alter their appli-
cation of immunity doctrine. Rather, it appears that the long-standing
tradition of prosecutorial immunity has endured whatever threat may
have been posed by Buckley v. Fitzsimmons. Buckley's promise of greater
liability for prosecutorial misconduct, a position which provoked a
five-to-four split among the Court and a dissent predicting upheaval
and incongruity in future immunity decisions, has been largely for-
saken by federal circuit courts either uncertain of the intended reach
of Buckley's holding or unwilling to impose any new burdens on the
prosecutor.
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339 See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274.
